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ABSTRACT: I argue, contrary to a recent assertion by Lilian Bermejo-Luque, that the inference-claim in
an argument of the form ‘p, so q’ is not its associated material conditional ‘if p then q’. Rather, it is the
claim that the argument has a covering generalization that is non-trivially true. I defend this interpretation
against three objections by Bermejo-Luque.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper I address the meaning of the word ‘so’ in its inferential use, and of other
inferential particles, both those like ‘so’ that introduce a conclusion and those like ‘since’
that introduce a premiss.
Since we are restricting our attention to inferential uses of such particles, their
meaning is in one way quite obvious. Roughly speaking, a conclusion indicator like ‘so’
indicates that the sentence that it immediately precedes follows from the sentence that
immediately precedes it, perhaps in combination with other sentences in the immediate
context. And, also roughly speaking, a premiss indicator like ‘since’ indicates that the
main clause of the sentence in which it occurs follows from the clause that immediately
follows it, perhaps in combination with other sentences in the immediate context. (I say
“roughly speaking” to allow for variants where a clause or phrase rather than a sentence
functions as a premiss or as the conclusion, and also for subordinate inferential clauses
within the main inferential structure. Also, I use the phrase “roughly speaking” to allow
for other accounts of what types of entities may be connected by an inferential particle or
phrase, such as utterances, propositions and speech acts.)
But what does it mean to say that a sentence follows from one or more sentences?
The Spanish philosopher Lilian Bermejo-Luque has recently claimed, in a paper
entitled “Toulmin’s model and the question of relativism”, that the inference-claim of any
argument is its corresponding material conditional (Bermejo-Luque 2006, p. 80). The
claim that an argument’s conclusion follows from its premisses, she says, is “the
particular [material] conditional that licenses the step from a particular reason to a
particular conclusion” (p. 80).
In opposition, I maintain that following means something logically stronger,
namely, a generalization of material implication. To avoid the misleading implications of
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the English word ‘if’, I shall express material implication in the form of a negated
conjunction, ‘not both the antecedent and not the consequent’. I shall refer to the negated
conjunction whose first conjunct is the conjunction of an argument’s premisses and
whose negated second conjunct is the negation of the same argument’s conclusion as that
argument’s “associated negajunction”. I maintain that to claim that a conclusion follows
from one or more premisses is to commit oneself to the non-trivial truth or acceptability,
for some non-empty set of content expressions, each of which occurs at least once in a
premiss or in the conclusion or both, and for a corresponding set of reference classes that
include in each case the object signified by the content expression, of a generalization,
possibly qualified, over those reference classes of the associated negajunction, with
respect to those content expressions. To take a hackneyed and traditional example, the
word ‘so’ in the argument ‘Socrates is human, so Socrates is mortal’ indicates more than
that it is not the case that Socrates is human and Socrates is not mortal. It indicates that
some generalization of this material conditional, such as the generalization ‘for every
animal x, it is not the case that x is human and x is not mortal’, is non-trivially true. (The
example of course reduces to what one would standardly take to be the argument’s
inference-licensing assumption: ‘Every human is mortal.’)
2. WHY AN ARGUMENT’S ASSOCIATED MATERIAL CONDITIONAL IS NOT
ITS INFERENCE-CLAIM
An argument’s associated material conditional (i.e. what I am calling its associated
negajunction) is not its inference-claim. To say that it is not the case that Socrates is
human and Socrates is not mortal is not to say that it follows from the fact that Socrates is
human that Socrates is mortal. The associated negajunction makes a much weaker claim
than the claim implicit in an illative like ‘so’ or ‘therefore’ that introduces a conclusion.
We can see that this is so by constructing an example where the associated negajunction
is true but the inference-claim is false. Consider, for example, the argument, ‘8 is
divisible by 2, so 6 is divisible by 2.’ This is clearly a bad argument, even though it has a
true premiss and a true conclusion. You cannot legitimately infer from the fact that 8 is
divisible by 2 that 6 is divisible by 2, even though as a matter of fact it is true that 6 is
divisible by 2. Thus the inference-claim in the argument ‘8 is divisible by 2, so 6 is
divisible by 2’ is false. But the associated negajunction ‘not both 8 is divisible by 2 and 6
is not divisible by 2’ is true, because the conjunction that is negated has a false conjunct,
namely ‘6 is not divisible by 2’, so that the conjunction is false and its negation true.
The claim that an argument’s associated negajunction is its inference-claim gets
its plausibility from expressing this negajunction as a conditional, ‘If the premisses are
true, then the conclusion is true’. Such a conditional clearly is the argument’s inferenceclaim, as ancient Stoic logicians recognized long ago (Diogenes Laertius VII.71). But its
truth-conditions are not those of the material or Philonian conditional. The conditional
statement ‘if 8 is divisible by 2, then 6 is divisible by 2’ is false, for exactly the same
reasons as the argument ‘8 is divisible by 2, so 6 is divisible by 2’ has a bad inference.
The conclusion of the argument does not follow from its premiss; similarly, the
consequent of the conditional does not follow from its antecedent. This example shows as
clearly as any that the truth-functional account of the truth-conditions for a particular
indicative conditional in natural languages is incorrect. It may be convenient to translate
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natural-language ‘if .. then’ particular sentences into a formal language with a horseshoe
or arrow as the main connective, and to treat this connective as signifying a truthfunction. But it is a convenient fiction.
My counter-example of course involves a case where the conclusion is known to
be true independently of the argument put forward in its support. Bermejo-Luque tries to
ward off this sort of counter-example by remarking that an argument’s associated
material conditional (i.e. its associated negajunction)
is to be valued under the argumentative conditions in which it arises, namely, that the reason
alleged in the argument (whose content is the antecedent of the conditional) is supposed to be true
or highly acceptable, and also that we have not already independently determined the real value of
the claim for which we argue (whose content is the consequent of the conditional). These
conditions suffice to free us from the paradoxes of material implication when appraising
[inference-claims]. (Bermejo-Luque 2006, p. 79)

So we are to construe my supposed counter-example as an argument presented in a
situation where it is supposed to be true that 8 is divisible by 2, but we have not already
determined independently whether 6 is divisible by 2. To make such a situation plausible,
let’s vary the example slightly to one where the arithmetical premiss is obviously true, the
arithmetical conclusion not yet determined to be true, and the inference apparently
incorrect. An example might be the argument: ‘20,472 is divisible by 3, so 20,472 is
divisible by 9.’ According to Bermejo-Luque, the fact that the premiss of this argument is
supposed to be true (and can in fact easily be checked to be true) but that we have not yet
determined whether the conclusion is true (because we have not yet tried to divide 20,472
by 9) frees us from the paradoxes of material implication when we come to appraise the
argument’s associated material conditional, i.e. the associated negajunction ‘Not both
20,472 is divisible by 3 and 20,472 is not divisible by 9.’ But surely the easiest and most
direct way to determine whether this negajunction is true, given that we know that the
first of the two conjuncts in the negated conjunction is true, is to check whether the
second one is also true. If the second conjunct is also true, then the whole conjunction is
true, the associated negajunction is false and the conclusion does not follow. If the second
conjunct is false, then the whole conjunction is false, the associated negajunction is true
and the conclusion (on Bermejo-Luque’s account) does follow. The fact that we have not
already determined the value of our conclusion does not bar us, when it comes to
appraising the associated negajunction, from making such a determination independently
of the argument offered in support of the conclusion. And, in any case where we have a
way of making such an independent determination, and that determination yields the
result that the conclusion is true, we will rightly conclude that the associated negajunction
is true. Thus, on Bermejo-Luque’s account, not only does every argument whose
conclusion is true make a true inference-claim (its conclusion follows from the premisses
offered in its support), but every argument whose conclusion can be independently
determined to be true makes an inference-claim that can be known to be true: its
conclusion demonstrably follows from the premisses offered in its support. Similarly,
every argument with an untrue premiss makes a true inference-claim (its conclusion
follows from the premisses offered in its support), and every argument with a premiss
that can be independently determined to be untrue makes an inference-claim that can be
known to be true: its conclusion demonstrably follows from the premisses offered in its
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support. Further, the only invalid arguments are ones that actually have true premiss(es)
and an untrue conclusion.
These are clearly unacceptable consequence, as we can readily see by
constructing simple examples of arguments with an obviously true conclusion and an
obviously irrelevant premiss. ‘Snow is white, so grass is green’ is not a good argument,
even though its premiss and its associated negajunction are both known to be true. The
conclusion that grass is green simply does not follow from the premiss that snow is white,
which is obviously totally irrelevant to the conclusion. A fortiori, it does not
demonstrably follow from this premiss. The word ‘so’ implies, as part of its meaning and
not as some pragmatic implicature of its ordinary use, that the statement preceding it is
relevant to the statement following, in the sense that it helps to establish the truth of the
conclusion (Hitchcock 1992).
3. WHAT AN ARGUMENT’S INFERENCE-CLAIM IS
I have argued previously (Hitchcock 1985, Hitchcock 1998), and still maintain, that the
inference-claim of an argument is the claim that some generalization of the argument’s
associated negajunction is non-trivially true. Any such generalization is equivalent in
force to a rule that claims an entitlement: ‘Data such as D entitle one to make claims such
as C,’ i.e. what Toulmin (1958, p. 98) calls a warrant. One only has such an unqualified
entitlement if claims such as C are true whenever we have corresponding data such as D.
And conversely, if it is non-trivially true that there are no cases where we have data such
as D but the corresponding claim C is not true, then data such as D do entitle us to make
claims such as C.
In opposition to this sort of position, Bermejo-Luque argues (2006, p. 78) that
general rules are not inference-claims, because they are not bridges between premiss(es)
and conclusions, for two independent reasons. First, several rules of inference are suitable
for any given argument. Second, every general rule can have conditions of rebuttal
applicable to the particular case stated by the argument. These two points are correct, and
they tell against identification of an argument’s inference-claim with some specific
general rule. But they do not tell against identification of the inference-claim with the
claim that some general rule or other licenses the transition from the premiss(es) to the
conclusion. The question ‘does this conclusion follow from these premisses?’ is not
identical with the question ‘is this particular generalization of the associated negajunction
non-trivially true?’ But it is identical with the question ‘Is some generalization of the
associated negajunction non-trivially true?’
From this perspective, a specific warrant, such as ‘Information that someone was
born in Bermuda entitles one to claim that this person is a British subject’, acts as support
for the more vague inference-claim, ‘Data such as the information that Harry was born in
Bermuda entitle one to make claims such as the claim that Harry is a British subject.’
(The example comes from Toulmin (1958, p. 99).) Or, to put the same point in terms of
generalizations of an argument’s associated negajunction, the non-trivial truth of a
specific generalization of the associated negajunction, such as the generalization that
everybody born in Bermuda is a British subject, provides support for the more general
inference-claim that some generalization of the associated negajunction is non-trivially
true.
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Bermejo-Luque deploys an infinite regress argument against this attempt to
construe a specific warrant as support for an argument’s inference-claim:
... if warrants justify the inferences, ... they should be reasons for the corresponding inferenceclaims. But, if warrants “justify” our inferences in this sense, every argument contains another
argument, namely the argument “warrant, so inference-claim”. But then, we would need a new
warrant to justify our inference from our warrant-reason-for-the-inference to our inference-claim,
and this warrant would be another reason with a new warrant to bridge the new gap, and so on.
Thus, we would never be entitled to infer a claim from a reason if warrants, as bridges between
reason and claim, should bridge the gap as justifications for our inferences. (Bermejo-Luque 2006,
p. 77)

On the account I am proposing, the inference-claim is an existential generalization, and
the warrant is an instance of this generalization, perhaps accompanied by information that
the instance does in fact fall under the generalization (e.g. that Harry is a human being).
Thus the account is subject to the opening step of Bermejo-Luque’s regress: every
argument contains (or least involves a commitment to) an argument ‘warrant, so
inference-claim’. The inference-claim of such a second-order argument is the claim of the
non-trivial truth of some generalization of the following associated negajunction: It is not
the case that a warrant such as this is true and the corresponding inference-claim is not
true. And the warrant supporting this inference-claim is that every existential
generalization with a true instance is true. This second-order warrant however is
obviously true. It does not need justification. Further, the inference from it to the secondorder inference-claim is obviously valid. We could if we liked make explicit the thirdorder inference-claim implicit in our argument, and the warrant supporting it. And there
is no end to the possibility of further ascent. But such further ascent is not needed to show
that the inference is justified. Thus Bermejo-Luque’s infinite regress argument does not
undermine my account of what is involved in inferring a conclusion from reasons offered
in its support.
The extent of abstraction involved in each step of the regress may leave it unclear
what exactly are the inference-claim and warrant at each step. So I shall illustrate the
sequence for the Harry argument:
First-order argument: Harry was born in Bermuda, so Harry is a British subject.
Inference-claim: Some generalization of the claim that it is not the case that Harry was
born in Bermuda and is not a British subject is non-trivially true.
Warrant: Every person born in Bermuda is a British subject, and Harry is a person.
Second-order argument: Every person born in Bermuda is a British subject, and Harry is
a person. So some generalization of the claim that it is not the case that Harry was born in
Bermuda and is not a British subject is non-trivially true.
Second-order inference-claim: Some generalization is non-trivially true of the claim that
it is not the case that every person born in Bermuda is a British subject, and Harry is a
person and no generalization of the claim that it is not the case that Harry was born in
Bermuda and is not a British subject is non-trivially true.
Second-order warrant: It is non-trivially true that every person born in Bermuda is a
British subject.
Third-order argument: It is non-trivially true that every person born in Bermuda is a
British subject. So some generalization is non-trivially true of the claim that it is not the
case that every person born in Bermuda is a British subject and Harry is a person and no
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generalization of the claim that it is not the case that Harry was born in Bermuda and is
not a British subject is non-trivially true.
Third-order inference-claim: Some generalization is non-trivially true of the claim that it
is not the case that it is non-trivially true that every person born in Bermuda is a British
subject and that no generalization is non-trivially true of the claim that it is not the case
that every person born in Bermuda is a British subject and Harry is a person and no
generalization of the claim that it is not the case that Harry was born in Bermuda and is
not a British subject is non-trivially true.
Third-order warrant: It is non-trivially true that every existential generalization with a
true instance is true.
The regress can continue, but it is not vicious. At an early stage, which may vary slightly
from one person to another, both the truth of the warrant at that stage and the truth of the
inference-claim at the next stage are evident. We must not be so sceptical as to refuse to
concede the truth of that which is perfectly obvious.
In personal correspondence, Bermejo-Luque has responded to this defence as
follows:
... I think that the infinite regress is benign from an epistemological point of view... But it is not ok
from a procedural point of view: the problem to conceive warrants as justifications is that warrants
license the step from reason to claim. But if they do so by justifying this step, and justification is
always a matter of having a sound argument, that is to say, an argument that would need a warrant
in this sense, then we would never be entitled to assert the claim because of the reason because we
would never have a proper justification for our warrant, as this justification would require a
justified warrant, and so on. In my view, the problem is to demand justification as a condition for
justification. (Bermejo-Luque to Hitchcock, e-mail message of 4 June 2005)

To this argument, I made the following reply:
This response strikes me as reasonable, but only if one thinks that every inferential move requires
justification. I don’t think that saying that warrants justify the inference implies that every
inferential move requires justification. Obviously the latter proposition leads to a vicious infinite
regress, unless one supposes that somehow the justification could be self-justification or circular.
One could adopt the dialectical approach of Toulmin's book, taking it that one needs to supply a
justification only if there is a challenge. One supplies grounds if one makes a claim and is asked,
“What do you have to go on?” One supplies a warrant if one adduces grounds for one's claim and
is then asked, “How do you get there?” I take it that, on your view, the applicability of the warrant
could be challenged in something like the following way: “How does that get you there?”, to
which the answer would be that the warrant covers the inference-claim. Theoretically, there is no
limit to the series of such challenges. But the claim has been justified to a challenger if the
challenger at some point stops making challenges and indicates that the series of responses to that
point is sufficient. (Hitchcock to Bermejo-Luque, e-mail message of 4 June 2005, supplemented
by subsequent clarification)

In the present paper, I have taken the alternative position that, at some early stage n of the
regress, the nth-order warrant and the n+1th-order inference-claim become self-justifying.
This position is the equivalent in an individualist epistemology of the position in a
dialectical epistemology that justification is only required in response to a challenge.
In the same correspondence, Bermejo-Luque has offered the following critique of
my claim that the inference-claim in an argument is that it has a covering generalization:
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... inference-claims are not covering generalizations, in general. Take the case of ... arguments like
‘Socrates is hungry, so he didn't have breakfast this morning’. It is because of the features of the
particular case stated by my reason (for example, that I'm talking of someone who usually has a
big breakfast, that it is only 10 o'clock in the morning, that he is not at home, or whatever) that I
can come to determine the truth-value of the particular inference-claim 'if Socrates is hungry, he
didn't have breakfast this morning'. I do not need any cover[ing] generalization, although I can try
to develop a suitable one, for example, for the sake of testing a hypothesis on Socrates’ habits, on
a person's need of food, or whatever. In my view, covering generalizations can justify the
particular inference-claim of an argument, but as justifications (and not as mere synonyms); they
can also fail to do so. (Bermejo-Luque to Hitchcock, e-mail message of 4 June 2005)

The invented argument ‘Socrates is hungry, so he didn't have breakfast this morning’
provides an occasion for me to elaborate on and clarify my general thesis in this paper.
Such arguments are clearly occasional, in the sense that their meaning and value is
closely tied to a particular occasion of utterance, i.e. a particular time and place, in the
way that an argument in a written text meant for a temporally and spatially indefinite
audience is not so closely tied to a particular occasion. To understand such an occasional
argument, we need to know who uttered it, what particular individuals are being referred
to by its constituent proper names and definite descriptions, and what background
knowledge about those particular individuals is being taken for granted as shared between
the arguer and the argument’s addressees. These “features of the particular case” stated
by the reason are indeed necessary for evaluating the inference-claim. But they are
necessary in order to understand exactly what the inference-claim is. The inference-claim
is not that ‘Socrates didn’t have breakfast this morning’ follows from ‘Socrates is
hungry’, but that ‘Socrates didn’t have breakfast this morning’ follows from ‘Socrates is
hungry, and it is 10 a.m., and Socrates usually has breakfast before 10 a.m. but never so
much before 10 a.m. that he would be hungry at 10 a.m.’ Once the content of the
argument is spelled out in this way, it becomes plausible that the inference-claim is that
some covering generalization of the argument’s associated negajunction is non-trivially
true.
Occasional arguments exhibit the kernel of truth in the missing premiss approach.
Such arguments do need “gap-filling” (Ennis 1982) supplementation by information
about the topic of the argument (i.e. the individual person or thing referred to in both
premisses and conclusion), information that is taken for granted as known by both arguer
and addressees. But this supplementation usually does not produce an argument that is
formally valid, contrary to the general assumption of the missing premiss approach that
the goal of supplementation is to produce an expansion that is formally valid (or perhaps
formally inductively strong). Rather, it produces an argument with an inference-claim
that is at least arguably correct, in the sense that some justified warrant licenses the
drawing of the conclusion from the supplemented premiss set.
4. CONCLUSION
In summary, I have argued that the inference-claim in an argument is not its associated
material conditional. Inferential uses of the word ‘so’ in contexts of the form ‘p, so q’ do
not mean simply that it is not the case that p and not q. If they did, then any true
statement would follow from whatever was adduced in its support, and any statement that
could be shown to be true would follow demonstrably from whatever was adduced in its
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support. Rather, the inference-claim of an argument is the claim that it has a covering
generalization that is non-trivially true. I have defended this interpretation of the meaning
of inferential words and phrases like ‘so’ against three objections. To the objection that
general rules to which such covering generalizations are equivalent are not inferenceclaims, because they are not bridges between premiss(es) and conclusions, I replied that
this point tells against identifying an argument’s inference-claim with some specific
covering generalization but not against identifying it with the claim that some covering
generalization or other is non-trivially true. To the objection that treating a specific
covering generalization (or the corresponding conditional entitlements that Toulmin calls
‘warrants’) as a justification for an argument’s inference-claim gives rise to a vicious
infinite regress, I replied that the regress is not vicious. To the objection that evaluation of
the inference-claim in occasional arguments like ‘Socrates is hungry, so he didn’t have
breakfast this morning’ requires consideration of the particular case rather than of some
covering generalization, I replied that the features of the particular case need to be
specified so as to understand exactly what the inference-claim is, after which it becomes
plausible that evaluating the inference-claim is a matter of looking for a non-trivially true
covering generalization of the (expanded) argument.
link to Weinstein commentary

link to Bermejo-Luque commentary
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